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Unexpected Circumstances arising from
World War I and its Aftermath: ‘Open’
versus ‘Closed’ Legal Systems
Janwillem Oosterhuis*
Abstract
European jurisdictions can be distinguished in ‘open’ and
‘closed’ legal systems in respect of their approach to unex-
pected circumstances occurring in contractual relations. In
this article, it will be argued that this distinction can be rela-
ted to the judiciary’s reaction in certain countries to the eco-
nomic consequences of World War I. The first point to be
highlighted will be the rather strict approach to unexpected
circumstances in contract law that many jurisdictions had
before the war – including England, France, Germany, and
the Netherlands. Secondly, the judicial approach in England,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands to unexpected cir-
cumstances arising from the war will be briefly analysed. It
will appear that all of the aforementioned jurisdictions
remained ‘closed’. Subsequently, the reaction of the judicia-
ry in these jurisdictions to the economic circumstances in the
aftermath of the war, (hyper)inflation in particular, will be
analysed. Germany, which experienced hyperinflation in the
immediate aftermath of the war, developed an ‘open’ sys-
tem, using the doctrine of the Wegfall der Geschäftsgrund-
lage. In the Netherlands, this experience failed to have an
impact: indeed, in judicial practice the Netherlands appears
to have a ‘closed’ legal system nevertheless, save for an
‘exceptional’ remedy in the new Dutch Civil Code, Article
6:258 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (1992). In conclusion, the
hypothesis is put forward that generally only in jurisdictions
that have experienced exceptional economic upheaval, such
as the hyperinflation in the wake of World War I, ‘excep-
tional’ remedies addressing unexpected circumstances can
have a lasting effect on the legal system.
Keywords: First World War, law of obligations, unforeseen
circumstances, force majeure, frustration of contracts
1 Introduction
European jurisdictions can be distinguished in ‘open’
and ‘closed’ legal systems in respect of their approach to
unexpected circumstances occurring in contractual rela-
tions. In this distinction, ‘open’ legal systems have
* Janwillem Oosterhuis is Assistant Professor in Methods and Foundations
of Law at the Maastricht University Faculty of Law. For the language
check, I would like to thank Lawrence Reddy.
established a general ‘exceptional’ doctrine specifically
addressing the issue of unexpected circumstances that
can lead to an adjustment of the contract. ‘Closed’ legal
systems do not offer such a solution either because they
do not have such an ‘exceptional’ doctrine or, even if
they have such a doctrine (as most jurisdictions do), this
doctrine generally cannot lead to an adjustment of the
contract.1
In this article, it will be argued that this distinction can
be related to the judiciary’s reaction in certain countries
to the economic consequences of World War I. The first
point to be highlighted will be the rather strict approach
to unexpected circumstances in relation to contractual
obligations that many jurisdictions had before the war
– including England, France, Germany, and the Neth-
erlands. Basically all European jurisdictions were
‘closed’ before the First World War: unsurprising, tak-
ing into account the overall favourable and stable eco-
nomic conditions since around the 1850s.
Secondly, the judicial approach in England, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands to unexpected circum-
stances arising from the war will be briefly analysed. It
will appear that all of the aforementioned jurisdictions
remained ‘closed’.
Subsequently, the reaction of the judiciary in these
jurisdictions to the economic circumstances in the after-
math of the war, (hyper)inflation in particular, will be
analysed. Germany, which experienced hyperinflation
in the immediate aftermath of the war, developed an
‘open’ system, using the doctrine of the Wegfall der
Geschäftsgrundlage. The experience gained from this
event was used in other European countries when they
had to deal with the consequences of great economic
and political instability, not only in the aftermath of
World War I but also of inter alia World War II. In the
Netherlands, this experience failed to have an impact:
indeed, in judicial practice the Netherlands appears to
have a ‘closed’ legal system nevertheless, save for an
‘exceptional’ remedy in the new Dutch Civil Code,
Article 6:258 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (1992).
In conclusion, the hypothesis is put forward that gener-
ally only in jurisdictions that have experienced excep-
tional economic upheaval, such as the hyperinflation in
1. See E. Hondius and H.C. Grigoleit, ‘Introduction: An approach to the
issues and doctrines relating to unexpected circumstances’, in E. Hon-
dius and H.C. Grigoleit (eds.), Unexpected Circumstances in European
Contract Law (2011) 3, at 10-11.
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the wake of World War I, ‘exceptional’ remedies
addressing unexpected circumstances can have a lasting
effect on the legal system.
2 Pre-1914: the Reign of
Absolute Impossibility
Since the 1870s, Europe, and particularly Western
Europe including Britain, the German Empire, France,
and the Netherlands, witnessed a period of considerable
economic growth. This growth was the result of,
amongst others, technological progress and the liberali-
sation of trade.2 Between 1871 and 1914, industrial pro-
duction in France and Britain more than doubled,
whereas the German industrial production rose more
than fivefold.3 In that same period, French external
trade – import and export – did not even double, British
trade roughly doubled, German trade rose threefold,
and Dutch trade even fivefold.4 Prices were nevertheless
stable and inflation low; this was also due to the adher-
ence to the Gold Standard.5
This economic growth and the increase in trade
required a timely performance of commercial transac-
tions: protection of the debtor – here in the broad sense
of a party to whom an obligation is owed – was of secon-
dary importance.6 Against this background, the rather
strict approach of legislatures and judiciaries towards
unexpected circumstances seems understandable
enough. Moreover, the Modern Natural Law of the sev-
2. See in general E. Damsgaard Hansen, European Economic History
(2001), at 155-173; F.B. Tipton and R. Aldrich, An Economic and Social
History of Europe, 1890–1939 (1987), at 9-26; T. Pierenkemper and
R. Tilly, The German Economy during the Nineteenth Century (2004),
at 143-51. See also W.O. Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial
Power 1834-1914 (1975), at 186-98.
3. See B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750–1970 (1978), at
179-81 (Table D1, Indices of Industrial Production; in this table no data
are available for the Netherlands for this period). See also H.J. Braun,
The German Economy in the Twentieth Century (1990), at 19-23.
4. See Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 297-307 (Table E1, External Trade).
See also W. Ashworth, An Economic History of England 1870-1939
(1960), at 138-62.
5. See Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 356-60 (Table G1, Banknote Circula-
tion), 389-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price Indices). See also Tipton,
Europe (1987), at 43-6.
6. E.M. Meijers, ‘Behoort verandering in de feitelijke omstandigheden,
waaronder een overeenkomst is gesloten, invloed te hebben op haar
voortbestaan? Zoo ja, welke wettelijke regeling is te dien aanzien wen-
schelijk?’, in Handelingen der Nederlandsche Juristen-Vereeniging I.1
(1918) 85, at 124. In detail J. Oosterhuis, Specific Performance in Ger-
man, French and Dutch law in the Nineteenth Century (2011), at
237-394.
enteenth and eighteenth centuries provided a theoretical
foundation for this uncompromising approach.7
2.1 England
Since at least the seventeenth century, the English legal
system was rather uncompromising in respect to con-
tractual duties.8 The general rule was that a change of
circumstances after a promise was made did not excuse
the promisor from performance, even if it made per-
formance impossible, see the rule in Paradine v. Jane.9
In 1863, however, in Taylor v. Caldwell,10 the parties
were discharged of their contractual duties because a
particular, specified thing that was needed to perform
the contract had perished – here the Surrey Music Hall.
This discharge upon the perishing of the thing without
the party’s fault was considered an implied condition.11
Frustration of contract became also accepted in cases of
maritime ventures, where the notion was embraced that
a contract might be terminated if its commercial pur-
pose was frustrated (see the rule in Jackson v. Union
Marine Insurance Company in 1874).12 The doctrine of
frustration was subsequently extended to cases where
performance was strictly speaking still possible, but the
commercial purpose of the contract was frustrated, such
as in one of the coronation cases, Krell v. Henry.13 But
7. For the historical development of the clausula rebus sic stantibus doc-
trine, and its decline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see e.g.
R. Zimmermann, ‘“Heard Melodies are sweet, but those unheard are
sweeter” – Condicio tacita, implied condition und die Fortbildung des
europäischen Vertragsrecht’, 193 Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis 123,
at 135-36 (1993); A. Thier, ‘Legal History’, in E. Hondius and H.C. Gri-
goleit (eds.), Unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law
(2011) 15, at 25-30; R. Meyer-Pritzl, ‘§§313-314: Störung der
Geschäftsgrundlage. Kündigung von Dauerschuldverhältnisse aus wich-
tigen Grund’, in M. Schmoeckel, J. Rückert & R. Zimmermann (eds.),
Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar zum BGB (2008), at II.4-5.
8. See G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (2003), at 866-67; G.H. Treitel,
Frustration and Force Majeure (1994), at 13-61; Zimmermann, Heard
Melodies (1993), at 137-42; H. Rösler, ‘Hardship in German Codified
Private Law – in Comparative Perspective to English, French and Inter-
national Contract Law’, European Review of Private Law 483, at
497-98 (3-2007).
9. Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn 26. See A.W.B. Simpson, ‘Innovation in
Nineteenth Century Contract Law’, in A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Theory
and Legal History (1987) 171, at 194; C. MacMillan, ‘Taylor v Caldwell
(1863)’, in Ch. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in the
Law of Contract (2008) 167, at 181-82; M. Lobban, ‘Contract’, in W.R.
Cornish et al. (eds.), The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol-
ume XII 1820-1914 (2010) 295, at 509.
10. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826. On this case see MacMillan,
Taylor v Caldwell (2008), at 167. See also A.D. McNair and A.D.
Watts, The Legal Effects of War (1966), at 159-60; Lobban, Contract
(2010), at 513-14; Treitel, Contract (2003), at 867; H. Beale et al.
(eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2010), at 1110;
Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 99.
11. On the continental influences on this doctrine, via Pothier and Black-
burn J., see Simpson, Innovation (1987), at 194-95; MacMillan, Taylor
v Caldwell (2008), at 193-94; Lobban, Contract (2010), at 514.
12. Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Company (1874) L.R. 10 C.P. 125.
See McNair, War (1966), at 163-65; Lobban, Contract (2010), at
516-17.
13. Krell v. Henry (1903) 2 K.B. 740. See McNair, War (1966), at 161-62;
Lobban, Contract (2010), at 518-19; Trotter, Contract (1940), at
122-23; Treitel, Contract (2003), at 866-67; Beale, Contract (2010), at
1114; Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 101. See, for an overview of
more nineteenth century cases, MacMillan, Taylor v Caldwell (2008), at
199-201; Lobban, Contract (2010), at 508-17; Zimmermann, Heard
Melodies (1994), at 140-42.
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here too the remedy was still rescission of contract.14
Moreover, extreme and unforeseen cost or difficulty of
performance itself, i.e. ‘commercial impossibility’, was
not held to be an excuse for non-performance.15
2.2 France
In French private law, the effect of changed or unfore-
seen circumstances upon existing contractual relations
had traditionally been handled through the doctrine of
force majeure (Articles 1147 and 1148 of the Code civil).
Unless a party had assumed the risk of impossibility, no
liability was incurred for non-performance if it was
impossible to perform the contract due to an event that
the parties could not reasonably have been expected to
foresee at the conclusion of the contract.16 Even tempo-
ral but indefinite impossibility could result in dispensa-
tion of the party unable to perform.17
However, if performance was still possible, the Cour de
Cassation refused to give relief on the grounds of change
of circumstances, which is demonstrated in the Canal de
Craponne case of 1876. Here, the Cour de Cassation deci-
ded that the Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence had violated
Article 1134 of the Code civil in adapting a contract con-
cerning the maintenance costs of the Craponne canal.
Although the contract was from 1567, long before the
promulgation of the Code civil in 1804, the Cour de Cas-
sation considered the adagium pacta sunt servanda, con-
tained in Article 1134, to be general and absolute.18 The
principle of good faith, laid down in the same Article
1134, was virtually never applied to adjust contracts.19
2.3 German Empire
The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, reflecting a liberal econom-
ic theory resting on individual autonomy and freedom of
ownership then prevailing, did not accord effects to
changed or unforeseen circumstances unless they ren-
dered performance of the contract impossible in a strict
14. Treitel, Contract (2003), at 867; Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 48.
15. E.g. Hong-Kong and Whampoa Dock Co.Ltd. v. Netherton Shipping
Co.Ltd. (1909) S.C. 34; Brown v. Royal Insurance Co. (1859) 1 E. & E.
853. See Trotter, Contract (1940), at 115.
16. A.T. von Mehren and J.R. Gordley, The Civil Law System (1977), at
1049. See also J. Ghestin, C. Jamin & M. Billiau, Traité de Droit Civil:
Les effets du contrat (2001), at 326; M. Fabre-Magan, Droit de obliga-
tions, 1 – Contrat et engagement unilatéral (2010), at 643; H., L., and
J. Mazeaud and F. Chabas, Leçons de droit civil, II-1: Obligations—thé-
orie générale (1998), at 573-80; Beale, Contract (2010), at 1095; Rös-
ler, Hardship (2007), at 500-501; F.E. Cooper, ‘Effects of Inflation on
Private Contracts: France, 1916-1926’, 6 Detroit L. Rev. 63, at 69-70
(1936).
17. E.g. Cass., 7 May 1872, D. 72.1.456; Cass. 23 February 1872, D.
72.1.187. See Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 97.
18. Cass. Civ., 6 March 1876, De Galliffet v. Commune de Pélissane, D.
1876.1.193. See Mazeaud, Leçons (1998), at 736; Ghestin, Effets
(2001), at nos. 296, 307; Fabre-Magan, Contrat (2010), at 480; Beale,
Contract (2010), at 1030-32; Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
1050-51; Rösler, Hardship (2007), at 500-501. See also Cass. Civ., 9
January 1856, D.P. 1856.1.33; Cass. Civ., 24 March 1874, Comuset,
Heina et comp. v. Way, S. 1874.1.428.
19. See E.M. Meijers, ‘Goede trouw en stilzwijgende wilsverklaring’, in
Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Weten-
schappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Deel 84, Serie B, no. 5 (1937), reissued in
E.M. Meijers, Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen. Derde deel
– Verbintenissenrecht (1955), at 279-80.
and objective sense.20 The drafters intended that the
provisions concerning impossibility of performance
– inter alia §§ 275(1), 280, 282, and 287 – were to be nar-
rowly construed and restricted to cases in which per-
formance could be deemed literally ‘impossible’ rather
than merely ‘extremely onerous’.21 They moreover
explicitly rejected inclusion of a general clausula rebus sic
stantibus doctrine.22 Finally, no one considered the good
faith provision of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch § 242 to be
relevant for dealing with the problem of changed or
unforeseen circumstances.23
Nevertheless, even before the war, courts sometimes
assimilated a debtor’s subsequent ‘inability’ to perform
with objective, subsequent impossibility (a notion found
in the Code) and extended it to economic
impossibility.24 In 1889, the Reichsgericht had already
held that even a temporal inability to perform could lead
to rescission of a contract: here a buyer claimed delivery
after a period of eight months, in which the supplier had
rebuilt his mill that had burned down.25 Furthermore,
in B. v. Bremer Rolandmühle of 1904, the seller was
relieved of his duty to deliver a specific cottonseed
product (Eichenlaub) because it had become so excep-
tionally difficult that it was considered by commerce as
the equivalent to impossible – here the seller was the
sole producer of this product and his specialist mill had
burned down. The seller’s duty to attempt finding sup-
plies of his own product was not without limit: he could
not be required to attempt to buy his brand on all Ger-
man and foreign markets.26
2.4 The Netherlands
The Dutch Civil code of 1838, the Burgerlijk Wetboek,
was largely a copy of the French Code civil, which had
been in force until then. Therefore, as in French private
law, the effect of changed or unforeseen circumstances
upon existing contractual relations had traditionally
been handled through the doctrine of force majeure
(Articles 1280 and 1281 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek).
Unless a party had assumed the risk of impossibility, no
liability was incurred for non-performance if it was
20. See F. Wieacker, ‘Das Sozialmodell der klassischen Privatrechtsgesetz-
bücher und die Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft (1953)’, in
F. Wieacker, Industriegesellschaft und Privatrechtsordnung (1974) 9, at
14; H. Dörner, ‘Erster Weltkrieg und Privatrecht’, 17 Rechtstheorie 385,
at 385 (1986); J.P. Dawson, ‘Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts:
Germany, 1914–1924’, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 171, at 175-7 (1934). See also
Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1066.
21. See 2 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (1888),
at 44-46. See for an overview of some pre-war cases, Oosterhuis, Spe-
cific Performance (2011), at 303-6.
22. See 2 Motive (1888), at 199. See also Wieacker, Sozialmodell (1974),
at 15.
23. Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1066.
24. E.g. Reichsgericht, 3 February 1914, 84 ERGZ 125. See Beale, Contract
(2010), at 1105-6.
25. Reichsgericht, 12 July 1889, SeuffA 45, 176. See on this decision Meij-
ers, Verandering (1918), at 95. See also e.g. Reichsgericht, 6 July 1898,
45 ERGZ 114.
26. Reichsgericht, 23 February 1904, 57 ERGZ 116. See on this decision
Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1067-1068; B.S. Markesinis,
H. Unberath & A. Johnston, The German Law of Contract (2006), at
326-27.
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impossible to perform the contract due to an event that
the parties could not reasonably have been expected to
foresee at the conclusion of the contract, and which
event could not be imputed to the non-performing par-
ty.27
Several courts, however, did not require an absolute or
objective impossibility of the performance but held that
force majeure existed if (i) it was for the debtor – tempo-
rarily – impossible to perform and (ii) he had made all
efforts that could be reasonably required from him as a
good housefather to perform.28 The scope of this sub-
jective impossibility was even extended because often
the creditor had to prove that his debtor’s efforts should
be considered insufficient.29 However, the event that
prevented the debtor to perform had to be unforeseea-
ble: the vagueness of this term gave courts considerable
discretion to, in spite of this, keep a debtor responsible
for his non-performance.30
An increase in prices was generally not accepted as force
majeure.31 Just like the Cour de Cassation, the Hoge Raad
virtually never revised contracts on the basis of the prin-
ciple of good faith32 as laid down in, e.g. Article 1374 of
the Burgerlijk Wetboek.
3 1914-1918: Absolute
Impossibility continued (but
with Exceptions)
In 1914, Europe and the rest of the world ended up in a
war. The German government anticipated a short war
to be won by military, not economic means. However,
27. See A.C. van Empel, Overmacht (1981), at 1-3.
28. E.g. Rb. Rotterdam, 18 June 1892, W. 6222 (temporal impossibility
constitutes force majeure); Rb. Rotterdam, 15 March 1909, W. 8957;
Rb. Amsterdam, 12 May 1911, W. 9281, confirmed Hof Amsterdam,
10 January 1913, W. 9534. Houwing had launched this definition of
force majeure in 1904, J.F. Houwing, ‘Overmacht of onmogelijkheid’,
R.M., at 250 (1904); but see already Hof Noord-Brabant, 6 April 1875,
W. 3879 (in which case the facts and decision were similar to Reichs-
gericht, 23 February 1904, 57 ERGZ 116). See Meijers, Verandering
(1918), at 133-35; S. van Brakel, Leerboek van het Nederlandsche Ver-
bintenissenrecht I (1942), at 119-20; Oosterhuis, Specific Performance
(2011), at 376-77. Critical M.G. Levenbach, De spanning van de kon-
traktsband (1923), at 61-62; J.L.L. Wery, Overmacht bij overeenkomst-
en (1919), at 114.
29. E.g. HR, 26 April 1907, W. 8533. See Brakel, Leerboek (1942), at 122.
Critical Levenbach, Kontraktsband (1919), at 106-31; Wery, Overmacht
(1923), at 94-99.
30. E.g. Rb. Groningen, 9 July 1886, W. 5372 (no force majeure); Rb. Rot-
terdam, 29 June 1892, W. 6230 (no force majeure). See, for an over-
view of 14 pre-war cases in which courts generally held that the event
creating the impossibility could have been foreseen, Wery, Overmacht
(1919), at 94-95. See also Meijers, Verandering (1919), at 135; Brakel,
Leerboek (1942), at 122; Oosterhuis, Specific Performance (2011), at
371.
31. Rb. Den Haag, 7 March 1912, W. v. N. en P. 2212. Otherwise Hof Den
Haag, 3 February 1911, W. 9241. See Meijers, Verandering (1918), at
176.
32. HR, 24 April 1891, W. 6030 and HR, 8 April 1910, W. 9019 mentioned
by Meijers, Goede trouw (1937), at 281, are less relevant, as these
cases concern a revision based on a contractual clause, and not by the
court on the basis of Article 1374(3) BW.
particularly in the West, the war developed into one of
attrition where the opposing forces of Germany, France,
and Britain mobilised their entire economies.33 As a
result, these and other European economies had to
respond to different challenges which moreover
changed over the course of the war.
In Britain, in August 1914, there was little appreciation
of the sheer scale of the war effort that would be needed
to defeat the Central Powers. Until 1917, state interven-
tion in and management of the economy was relatively
ad hoc in approach and tended to be reactive rather than
proactive. As the war lengthened, the private-sector-
oriented ‘business as usual’ philosophy gave way to
direct government control, and particularly the Ministry
of Munitions expanded its role to cover a wide range of
economic activities. The fact that real GDP increased
during the war was also due to a dramatic increase in
government expenditure. Britain was highly dependent
on imported food supplies, as a result of the pre-war
policy of free trade. These food imports were vulnerable
to U-boat attack and mounting shipping losses brought
about a change of policy, viz. to increase the production
of grains and potatoes at the cost of the production of
meat. During the war, the value of British imports
almost doubled, although British exports stayed roughly
the same.34 The annual average wholesale prices in Brit-
ain would not increase by any more than 100% during
the war, compared to the annual wholesale prices in
1914.35
To the French economy, the war represented an enor-
mous shock: at the end of the war, the French GDP had
fallen to a trough more than 30% below its 1913 level.
The break-up of trade relationships with Germany,
Austria, Hungary, and soon Belgium and other invaded
regions, representing around one-third of French
imports and exports in 1913, seriously affected the
goods markets. In real terms, French exports declined,
reaching a low of one-third of their 1913 level in 1918.
Imports, however, increased sharply from 1915 to 1917,
which also helped to compensate for the occupation of
north-eastern France, and the decrease in French pro-
duction of various goods.36 Direct state intervention
remained limited: only in foreign trade did the state
intervene more directly, but this came only in 1917.
Although inflation started to rise, the annual average
wholesale prices in France would not increase by any
33. See S. Broadberry and M. Harrison, ‘The economics of World War I: an
overview’, in S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.) The Economics of
World War I (2005) 3, at 4; Tipton, Europe (1987), at 135-62.
34. S. Broadberry and P. Howlett, ‘The United Kingdom during World War
I: business as usual?’, in S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.) The Eco-
nomics of World War I (2005) 206, at 206-13, 220-22. See also Mitch-
ell, Statistics (1978), at 304-7 (Table E1, External Trade).
35. See Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 389-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price
Indices); Broadberry, The United Kingdom (2005), at 218-19.
36. P.-C. Hautcoeur, ‘Was the Great War a watershed? The economics of
World War I in France’, in S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.) The
Economics of World War I (2005) 169, at 170, 181-82. See also Mitch-
ell, Statistics (1978), at 304-7 (Table E1, External Trade).
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more than 150% during the war, compared to the annu-
al wholesale prices in 1914.37
German annual national income and output declined
during the war. From 1916 onwards, when government
control over the economy was tightened, the output of
armament-related industries increased. However, out-
put in other industries and agriculture decreased or
dried up. The Allied naval blockade inflicted far greater
damage on the German war economy than the German
U-boat campaign did to England. In real terms, German
imports during the war remained at 40–60% below their
peacetime levels, while exports fell even further.38 Up
until 1916, Germany had been moderately successful in
evading the Allied blockade by increasing imports of
foodstuffs from the neighbouring neutrals, notably from
the Netherlands and Denmark. But the intensified
blockade after 1916 resulted in a sharp reduction of
German food imports.39 Although inflation started to
rise, the annual average wholesale prices in the German
Empire would not increase by any more than 100% dur-
ing the war, compared to the annual wholesale prices in
1914.40
Generally, the British, French, and German govern-
ments overestimated the importance of international
trade in economic development and hence in a nation’s
capacity to wage war; all underestimated the resilience
and flexibility of their domestic economies. In contrast
to expectations, these nations proved able to reorganise
their domestic economies in isolation from the interna-
tional economy.41
The Dutch preserved neutrality, for instance through
the Netherlands Overseas Trust Company, but had to
accept many compromise measures against its sovereign
rights. Trade and exports continued, with declining vol-
umes but rising prices. Exports into Germany increased
considerably and Dutch agricultural products helped
Germany to continue its war effort. From 1913 to 1916,
real GDP declined slightly to 96% of what it had been
in 1913. Only the years 1917 and 1918 stand out as years
of low economic activity due to trade limitations.42
Though inflation started to rise, the annual average
wholesale prices in the Netherlands would not increase
by any more than 150%, compared to the annual whole-
sale prices in 1914 – probably also as a result of exten-
sive government intervention in the economy, such as
37. Hautcoeur, France (2005), at 186-87, 193; Mitchell, Statistics (1978),
at 389-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price Indices).
38. A. Ritschl, ‘The pity of peace: Germany’s economy at war, 1914–1918
and beyond’, in S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.) The Economics of
World War I (2005) 41, at 45-49, 51-52. See also Mitchell, Statistics
(1978), at 304-7 (Table E1, External Trade).
39. Ritschl, Germany’s Economy (2005), at 58-59.
40. See Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 389-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price
Indices).
41. Tipton, Europe (1987), at 156.
42. H. de Jong, ‘Between the devil and the deep blue sea: the Dutch econo-
my during World War I’, in S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.) The
Economics of World War I (2005) 137, at 139-44, 147, 164. See also
Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 304-7 (Table E1, External Trade).
setting maximum prices and implementing export
restrictions for basic foodstuffs.43
The war conditions resulted in hardship for contractual
parties who (i) could not, or only against great cost
obtain the goods they should deliver, or who (ii) could
still deliver but saw their monetary counter performance
greatly reduced in value. During the war itself, however,
the English, French, German, and Dutch judiciary
stuck largely to the existing approaches to dealing with
cases where parties, due to the war, could no longer – or
became highly unwilling to – perform their commercial
sale contracts. In none of the jurisdictions would the
courts revise a contract for unforeseen circumstances
– except in France, where the Conseil d’état relied on the
doctrine of imprévision: rescission thus remained the stan-
dard remedy in case of impossibility. The English and
German courts, however, would sometimes discharge a
contract if the performance – after a temporal impossi-
bility – would amount to something else than originally
contracted for. Discharge of a contract due to an
increase in prices was basically not admitted anywhere.
Admittedly, this pan-European judicial reluctance to
interfere in private contractual relations can be related
to the still prevailing liberal, individualist economic the-
ories and the initial desire to continue with ‘business as
usual’ – also because the war was expected to be short-
lived. This deep reluctance against judicial interference
in private contractual relations is reflected in the earlier
decline of the clausula rebus sic stantibus doctrine in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and a simultaneous
strong emphasis on the sanctity of contracts, the bind-
ingness of contractual obligations, and the right to spe-
cific performance in this period.44
3.1 England
The First World War gave rise to a significant number
of cases in which contracts were held to have been dis-
charged by supervening impossibility.45 Even when per-
formance was still possible, but a supervening event
prevented a party to put the subject-matter, a person or
thing, to the intended use, courts occasionally held con-
tracts to be frustrated – in line with the rule in Krell v.
Henry46 (see, e.g., Horlock v. Beal).47
However, at the beginning of the war, courts appeared
to be rather reluctant to discharge a contract, probably
43. See Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 389-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price
Indices); De Jong, Dutch Economy (2005), at 157.
44. See Zimmermann, Heard Melodies (1993), at 135-36; Thier, Legal His-
tory (2011), at 25-30; Oosterhuis, Specific Performance (2011), at
52-85, 90-6, 115-18, 127-29, 216-19, 221-32.
45. Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 49-50.
46. Krell v. Henry (1903) 2 K.B. 740.
47. Horlock v. Beal (1916) A.C. 486 (a wife’s claim for her husband’s (a
seaman) wages resulted in the discharge of the contract, due to the
frustration of the adventure – or failure of consideration: see, critical,
R.G. McElroy and G.L. Williams, Impossibility of Performance: A Trea-
tise on the Law of Supervening Impossibility of Performance of Con-
tract, Failure of Consideration, and Frustration (1941), at 152-55). Also
e.g. Scottish Navigation Co. Ltd. v. W.A. Souter & Co. (1917) 1 K.B.
222. See W.F. Trotter, The Law of Contract During and After War
(1940), at 123-24; R. Gottschalk, Impossibility of Performance in Con-
tract (1945), at 29-30; Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 292; Meijers,
Verandering (1918), at 101.
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also motivated by the initial desire to continue with
‘business as usual’. If, for instance, not the entire pur-
pose was frustrated, courts would not discharge a con-
tract. Therefore, in 1916, a contract to ‘provide, main-
tain, and light’ street lamps was not frustrated when
wartime black-out regulations prohibited the lighting of
such lamps, since the maintenance obligation remained
possible.48 Also, if performance for some balance of a
contract remained or was likely to remain possible, the
outcome of claims for that balance depended on the pro-
portion of the interruption or likely interruption to the
contract period. For instance, long-term commission
agency was held not to be frustrated when the agent was
interned, since his internment was not likely to last long
(and in fact only lasted one month);49 the wartime requi-
sition of a ship in February 1915 did not frustrate a five-
year charter which was not due to expire till December
1917.50 In the latter case, Tamplin SS Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-
Mexican Petroleum Co., even though the contract was
not discharged, Lord Loreburn stated that ‘... no Court
has an absolving power, but it can infer from the nature
of the contract and the surrounding circumstances that a
condition which is not expressed was a foundation on
which the parties contracted.’51 This definition, by
emphasising that discharge of a contract could also be
based on an implied condition, helped to considerably
widen the potential scope of impossibility of perform-
ance.52
Towards the end of the war, indeed in extension of the
rule in Taylor v. Caldwell,53 in several cases discharge
was given because the subject-matter, a person or thing,
had become – temporarily – unavailable for perform-
ance: charter parties, for example, were held to be frus-
trated where the ship was requisitioned.54 In 1918, it
was held that the balance of a contract could be frustra-
ted when, at the time of the requisition, a one-year char-
ter still had six months to run: it was unlikely that the
ship would be released in time to render any services
under the charter.55 In some cases, where long delays in
performance resulted from wartime restrictions, it was
held that performance need not be resumed in the total-
ly altered conditions which prevailed when those
48. Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban DC (1916) 2 K.B. 428.
See Trotter, Contract (1940), at 131; Treitel, Contract (2003), at 886;
Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 102.
49. Nordman v. Rayner & Sturgess (1916) 33 T.L.R. 87. See Treitel, Con-
tract (2003), at 875.
50. Tamplin SS Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Co. (1916), 2 A.C.
397.
51. Tamplin SS Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Co. (1916), 2 A.C.
397, at 403-4. Critical McElroy, Impossibility (1941), at 155-65. See
also Trotter, Contract (1940), at 120 and 124-26; Gottschalk, Impossi-
bility (1945), at 30-32; Treitel, Contract (2003), at 874; Meijers, Veran-
dering (1918), at 102.
52. McElroy, Impossibility (1941), at 159.
53. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
54. E.g. Anglo-American Trading Co. v. Emlyn Jones & Williams (1917) 2
K.B. 78; Heilgers & Co. v. Cambrian Steam Navigation Co. (1917) 34
T.L.R. 720. Trotter, Contract (1940), at 120; Treitel, Contract (2003), at
872-74.
55. E.g. Countess of Warwick SS Co. v. Le Nickel SA (1918) 1 K.B. 372. See
Treitel, Contract (2003), at 874.
restrictions were removed.56 In Metropolitan Water
Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. of 1918, Lord Dunedin laid
down a test as to whether a contract should be dissolved
or merely suspended: ‘An interruption may be so long
as to destroy the identity of the work or service, when
resumed, with the work or service when interrupted.’57
This test contained no reference to an implied condition
because performance was prevented by supervening leg-
islation.58 Courts generally appeared to base the dis-
charge of contracts on the – more objective – frustration
of the adventure, and less so on a – subjective – implied
condition.59 Moreover, in all of these cases commercial
impracticability alone was therefore insufficient ground
to discharge a contract.60
It can be clearly seen that in many cases contracts were
held not to be frustrated at all: in 1918, for example, a
seller who expected to get supplies of birch timber from
Finland – the supply of which had become impossible
after the outbreak of war in 1914 – was held to the con-
tract, as only he had intended to use Finland as the sole
source of supply.61 Also the rise of prices caused by the
outbreak of the war did not discharge a contract.62
The case law regarding the discharge of contracts by
supervening impossibility appeared to be not entirely
consistent, not in the least as to why exactly a contract
was discharged from a legal point of view, namely, on
the basis of an implied condition, frustration of the
adventure, or simply for failure of consideration.63
However, apart from doctrinal inconsistencies attributa-
ble to a developing doctrine of frustration, the increas-
ing number of cases in which contracts were held to be
discharged by supervening impossibility – particularly
in the years 1917 and 1918 – seems to result from the
changing nature of war. The war had become one of
attrition for which the entire economy had to be mobi-
lised, for instance by, at the beginning of 1917, placing
the whole merchant marine under the authority of a
Shipping Controller.64
3.2 France
Unlike the English judiciary, in the area of private law
the French courts never extended impossibility of per-
56. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. (1918) A.C. 119.
57. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. (1918) A.C. 119, at 128.
58. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. (1918) A.C. 119, at 130.
See McElroy, Impossibility (1941), at 166-67; Gottschalk, Impossibility
(1945), at 32-33. See also Trotter, Contract (1940), at 132; Treitel,
Contract (2003), at 873, 882; Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 217.
59. See McElroy, Impossibility (1941), at 163.
60. See, for an overview of war-time cases, Trotter, Contract (1940), at
116. See also Gottschalk, Impossibility (1945), at 34; Treitel, Contract
(2003), at 882.
61. Blackburn Bobbin Co. Ltd. v. TW Allen Ltd. (1918) 2 K.B. 467. See
Trotter, Contract (1940), at 134-35; Treitel, Contract (2003), at 876;
Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 101-2.
62. E.g. Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd. v. Wilson & Co. Ltd. (1917) A.C. 495;
Bolckow Vaughan & Co. v. Compañia Minera de Sierra Minera (1916)
33 T.L.R. 111 (C.A.); Greenway Bros. Ltd. v. Jones & Co. (1916) 32
T.L.R. 184. See Trotter, Contract (1940), at 116; Mann, Legal Aspect
(1982), at 111; Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 103.
63. See, in detail, McNair, War (1966), at 166-77; McElroy, Impossibility
(1941), at 150-69.
64. See Broadberry, The United Kingdom (2005), at 214.
72
ELR October 2014 | No. 2
formance to include frustration of purpose or economic
impracticability.65 Holding to their previous views that
impossibility of performance must be absolute,66 courts
ruled that the outbreak of the war and the subsequent
increase in the cost or difficulty of performance could
not constitute force majeure: e.g. in 1915, a shop had to
pay damages under an employment contract to a seam-
stress, even if no work was available;67 and in 1918, a
lease was not terminated because an apartment had sur-
vived a bombardment, here of the city of Nancy,
France.68 To alleviate the hardships caused by inflation,
chiefly the lower courts manipulated the damage reme-
dy – as the measure of recovery generally lies outside
the control by the Cour de Cassation. Where a change in
the value of goods or services could be attributed to a
change in the value of money, a buyer was supposed not
to have suffered substantial damage.69
In contrast to the attitude taken by the Cour de Cassa-
tion, the Conseil d’état during the war further developed
and used the doctrine of imprévision, a modified version
of economic impracticability, to relieve parties from the
effects of war.70 The doctrine of imprévision entitled
courts to terminate or revise contracts whenever per-
formance became extremely burdensome, though not
objectively impossible to one of the parties, due to a
substantial and unforeseen change in economic circum-
stances.71 The doctrine was limited to government con-
tractors and was mainly used to alter the rate schedules
of public utility companies engaged in the distribution
of electricity and gas by ordering payment of an indem-
nity as compensation for increased costs of
production.72 In the leading case, Gas de Bordeaux of
1916, the Conseil d’état held that price revision was
appropriate because the increase in the cost of perform-
ance
‘certainly exceeds the outer limits of the increases
that could have been contemplated by the parties
when the contract of concession was concluded; as a
65. See e.g. Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 307; Mazeaud, Leçons (1998), at
736; Rösler, Hardship (2007), at 500-501; Von Mehren, Civil Law
(1977), at 1049; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 69-70.
66. E.g. Cass. Civ., 6 March 1876, De Galliffet v. Commune de Pélissane,
D. 1876.1.193; Cass. Civ., 24 March 1874, Comuset, Heina et comp. v.
Way, S. 1874.1.428. See also Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
1050-51; Rösler, Hardship (2007), at 500-501.
67. Cass. Civ., 4 August 1915, Maison Agnes v. Maalderinck, D.
1916.1.22. See Ghestin, Effets (2001), at no. 307; Von Mehren, Civil
Law (1977), at 1051-52.
68. Cass. req., 3 July 1918, Durlach v. Grandgérard, S. 1918-19.1.160. See
Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1065-66.
69. See, also for more cases, J.P. Dawson and F.E. Cooper, ‘The Effect of
Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879’, 33 Mich. L.
Rev. 852, at 890 (1935); Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 75.
70. See Fabre-Magan, Contrat (2010), at 480; Ghestin, Effets (2001), at
315; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 76, 81; Von Mehren, Civil Law
(1977), at 549.
71. The legal basis of this doctrine was subject to scholarly debate, see
Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 84-87.
72. Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 315; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 77-78.
result ... the contractual equilibrium is completely
destroyed.’73
Here, the increase in the price of coal, needed to make
gas, was more than 400%.74 In the interest of maintain-
ing uninterrupted services to the public, the court
refused to grant rescission, and, in the absence of agree-
ment by the parties, the general aim was to divide the
loss between the two parties.75 Relief was initially
restricted to long-term contracts formed in pre-war
days, but was later extended to short-term contracts
formed during the time of war.76 Despite its various
limitations,77 the doctrine proved to be a useful tool in
mitigating the effects of inflation in the administrative
area during the war.78 Probably unsurprisingly, the doc-
trine of imprévision was of administrative jurisprudence:
the Conseil d’état had jurisdiction over all contracts for
public service, and it was essential that the fundamental
public services be continued.79 In case of private con-
tracts, little public harm would result from non-per-
formance, and moreover relief to oppressed obligors
sued for breach of contract could be afforded indirectly
by trial judges fixing damages.80
The French legislature also took an active role during
the war (and also post-war) inflation: at least nine stat-
utes were passed trying to ameliorate the position of
contractual parties severely affected by inflation,81 the
most famous of which is the Loi Faillot of 21 January
1918, which essentially integrated the doctrine of com-
mercial impracticability into positive law. This statute
permitted termination of certain types of commercial
contracts concluded prior to 1 August 1914, calling for
successive performances – although, e.g. contracts of
loan or lease contracts were excepted – if performance
had become unforeseeably onerous to one of the parties.
If the parties could not agree to a price revision, the
73. C.E., 30 March 1916, Compagnie Générale d’Eclairage de Bordeaux v.
Ville de Bordeaux, D. 1916.3.25, S. 1916.3.17. See Fabre-Magan, Con-
trat (2010), at 480-81; Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 315; Von Mehren,
Civil Law (1977), at 545-47.
74. Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 73-74.
75. Ghestin, Effets (2001), at no. 315; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 75-77;
Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 548-49.
76. Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 77-79; Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
549.
77. Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 315; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 78-81; Von
Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 550-51; Mann, Legal Aspect (1982), at
102-3.
78. E.g. C.E. 21 July 1917, Compagnie générale des automobiles postales,
Rec. Lebon, 586; C.E., 8 February 1918, Gaz de Poissy, Rec. Lebon,
122. See Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 315. Although the economic disrup-
tion after the war was more serious than during the war, particularly
between 1919 and 1927, only in a few cases relief was given in this
period, probably because most of the electric light companies had ach-
ieved a re-making of rates during the war that could carry them
through the rest of the inflation era, see Cooper, Inflation (1936), at
75.
79. See Mazeaud, Leçons (1998), at 735; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 75.
Less convinced, Fabre-Magan, Contrat (2010), at 481.
80. See directly above and again Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 75.
81. See, in detail, Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 87-90; Ghestin, Effets
(2001), at 300-304; Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1061-62; Mann,
Legal Aspect (1982), at 103; Renner, Inflation (1999), at 15-16.
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statute authorised courts to suspend or resolve the con-
tract with or without award of damages.82
3.3 German Empire
After the outbreak of war, German courts initially
showed great adherence to the literal words of the Bür-
gerliches Gesetzbuch – probably also motivated by the
illusion of a brief war and the desire to continue ‘busi-
ness as usual’ – and were unwilling to grant relief to
many contracts affected by wartime conditions:83 a les-
see had to pay pre-war rent for a circus building in Ber-
lin – good faith and commercial morals did not justify in
any way whatsoever the shifting to the lessor the loss
that the war had caused to the lessee;84 a magazine could
not discharge an editor without notice – the newspaper
had not shown that it had to cease publication;85 a seller
had to deliver tin, even if the prices had risen with more
than 200% since the conclusion of the contract – a sub-
jective inability does not free the debtor from an obliga-
tion involving a type (Gattungsschuld) so long as per-
formance of this type is possible;86 the rent of a beer hall
was not reduced, despite the government’s order to
reduce the total beer production by a third.87
Gradually, however, as the war progressed, the courts
started to be somewhat more flexible with respect to
impossibility of performance, and in certain cases rescis-
sion was granted, for instance where a government ban
on dancing prevented the lessee to use a dance hall from
being used as the contract contemplated.88 Also when
performance had become temporarily, but for an indefi-
nite period of time, impossible, the Reichsgericht would
grant rescission.89
82. See Mazeaud, Leçons (1998), at 737; Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 301;
Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 87-88; Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
1061-62; Renner, Inflation (1999), at 15.
83. Fundamental on the legal preconditions and consequences of the Ger-
man hyperinflation from 1914 to 1948, J. Thiessen, ‘German Hyperin-
flation of the 1920s – a Study on Cases’, in W. Ernst and D. Fox (eds.),
Money in the Western Legal Tradition (forthcoming). See, also on the
effects of the war economy on German contract law in general, Dörner,
Erster Weltkrieg (1986), at 385, 398-99; S-R. Eiffler, ‘Die “Feuertaufe”
des BGB: Das Vertragsrecht des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs und das
Kriegswirtschaftsrecht des 1. Weltkriegs’, 20 Zeitschrift für Neuere
Rechtsgeschichte 238-55 (1998); in more detail on the following deci-
sions, Dawson, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 178-81; Beale, Contract
(2010), at 1138.
84. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 4 May 1915 (S. v. B.), 86 ERGZ 397.
85. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 30 November 1915 (B. v. T.), 87
ERGZ 349.
86. Reichsgericht, Second Civil Senate, 21 March 1916 (C. v. M.), 88 ERGZ
172.
87. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 3 July 1917 (H. v. Norddeutsche
Immobilien-Akt.-Ges.), 90 ERGZ 374.
88. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 9 November 1915 (P. v. G.), 87 ERGZ
277.
89. E.g. Reichsgericht, 4 January 1916, J.W. 16, 487; Reichsgericht, Second
Civil Senate, 4 February 1916, 88 ERGZ 71; Reichsgericht, 23 May
1916, J.W. 16, 1017; Reichsgericht, Second Civil Senate, 27 March
1917, 90 ERGZ 102; Reichsgericht, 6 July 1917, J.W. 18, 33; Reichs-
gericht, 15 October 1918, 94 ERGZ 45. See Dörner, Erster Weltkrieg
(1986), at 399-400; Eiffler, BGB im 1. Weltkrieg (1998), at 252-53;
Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 95; Beale, Contract (2010), at 1138;
and, for a more detailed overview of the contemporary case law, Daw-
son, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 181-82.
However, these cases seemed to remain exceptions to
the principle that rescission was basically only granted
when performance was literally impossible.90
3.4 The Netherlands
Already before the war, courts had sometimes assimila-
ted the practically impossible with the absolutely impos-
sible,91 and this became generally accepted during the
war.92 However, although the courts adopted the notion
of subjective impossibility – or rather commercial
impracticability – developed before the war, in hardly
any cases force majeure was accepted.93 The judiciary
simply stressed that the event making performance
impossible had to be unforeseen, and this turned out to
hardly ever be the case.94 Just as the courts in England,
France, and the German Empire, Dutch courts during
the war appeared to be reluctant to rescind or interfere
with contracts because of an increase in prices.95 Courts
were neither willing to grant relief on the basis of the
90. See Eiffler, BGB im 1. Weltkrieg (1998), at 249-52.
91. E.g. Hof Noord-Brabant, 6 April 1875, W. 3879. See Oosterhuis, Specif-
ic Performance (2011), at 376-77.
92. E.g. Rb. Haarlem, 1 June 1915, N.J. 15, 698; Rb. Rotterdam, 30 June
1915, N.J. 15, 855, W. 9800, confirmed Hof Den Haag, 19 November
1915, W. 9905 (force majeure); Rb. Amsterdam, 29 October 1915, N.J.
15, 1186 and 1188; Rb. Rotterdam, 17 December 1915, N.J. 16, 434;
Rb. Den Bosch, 26 March 1915, N.J. 16, 439 (no force majeure); Rb.
Utrecht, 12 January 1916, N.J. 16, 1050; Hof Amsterdam, 6 October
1916, N.J. 17, 275; Hof Arnhem, 27 March 1917, N.J. 17, 881 (no
force majeure); Rb. Amsterdam, 28 April 1916, W. 10071 (no force
majeure); Rb. Amsterdam, 14 April 1916, W. 10087 (no force majeure).
Exceptionally, Hof Den Haag, 8 December 1916, W. 10129 (price
increase of 20 to 25% cent constitutes force majeure). See Meijers,
Verandering (1918), at 135.
93. Exceptionally, Hof Den Haag, 8 December 1916, W. 10129 (price
increase of 20 to 25% constitutes force majeure). See Fruin, Verander-
ing (1918), at 72; Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 135.
94. No force majeure because either (i) the event should be unforeseen
(Rb. Den Haag, 20 April 1916, W.P.N.R. 2423; Rb. 7 May 1917, N.J.
17, 809; Rb. Amsterdam, 23 November 1917, N.J. 18, 100; Rb.
Utrecht, 14 March 1917, N.J. 18, 97); or (ii) the debtor should have
foreseen the difficulties (Rb. Utrecht, 18 April 1918, N.J. 17, 1059; Rb.
Zwolle, 19 December 1917, N.J. 18, 174); or (iii) the debtor implicitly
took the risk (Rb. Rotterdam, 29 June 1915 W. 9854; Rb. Rotterdam
16 December 1915, N.J. 16, 432; Rb. Amsterdam, 25 June 1917, N.J.
17, 876; Rb. Haarlem, 6 November 1917, N.J. 18, 176) or (iv) the debt-
or has to bear the risk according to the law (Rb. Rotterdam, 5 October
1916, N.J. 17, 883). See Wery, Overmacht (1919), at 95-96. Leven-
bach, Kontraktsband (1923), at 107, lists another twelve war-time cases
in which no force majeure was accepted because the event was not
considered to be unforeseen. See also Levenbach, Kontraktsband
(1923), at 113-14.
95. E.g. Rb. Amsterdam, 4 December 1914, W. v. N. en P. 2351; Rb. Den
Bosch, 26 March 1915, N.J. 16, 439; Hof Amsterdam, 2 March 1917,
W. 10140; Hof Arnhem, 27 March 1917, N.J. 17, 881; Rb. Amsterdam,
23 November 1917, N.J. 18, 100; Rb. Dordrecht, 5 December 1917,
N.J. 18, 177. Exceptionally otherwise, Hof Den Haag, 8 December
1916, W. 10129 (price increase of 20 to 25% constitutes force
majeure). See Levenbach, Kontraktsband (1923), at 203; Th.A. Fruin,
‘Behoort verandering in de feitelijke omstandigheden, waaronder een
overeenkomst is gesloten, invloed te hebben op haar voortbestaan?
Zoo ja, welke wettelijke regeling is te dien aanzien wenschelijk?’, in
Handelingen der Nederlandsche Juristen-Vereeniging I.1 (1918) 1, at
72; Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 176. Critical about possible force
majeure because of an increase in prices, W.L.P.A. Molengraaff, De
gevolgen van den oorlog op handelsovereenkomsten, in het bijzonder
op leveringscontracten (1915), at 23-25.
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good faith principle in, e.g. Article 1374(3) of the Bur-
gerlijk Wetboek.96
4 Post-1918: Inflation and
‘Open’ versus ‘Closed’
Systems
The recovery from the war varied in Britain, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands, although most govern-
ments tried to return to the pre-war gold standard due
to widespread belief that such was necessary if the
growth and prosperity of the pre-1914 era were to be re-
established.97
The older British industrial centres lagged behind inter-
national competitors. Therefore, prices were to be held
low to support British exports, which led to severe
deflationary policies in 1919 and 1929. However, the
British government had returned to the gold standard
and, for instance, in 1924 the pound was overvalued,
severely hampering exports. Therefore, Britain’s recov-
ery only came about slowly, around 1937.98
The old industries in France also suffered from interna-
tional competition. However, new industries soon grew
substantially. France did not return to the gold stan-
dard, and French exports benefitted from the decline in
value of the franc. Investment was made easier through
inflation. However, with the depression, French exports
dropped 60% between 1929 and 1935, also due to the
overvalued franc, as other countries abandoned gold as
well.99
Though defeated and burdened with reparations pay-
ments, Germany boomed through 1922 while other
industrial economies faltered. Germany had suffered
only the indirect damage of neglected maintenance and
delayed replacement during the war. The government
allowed the exchange rate to slip and made credit availa-
ble through the Reichsbank, especially to large firms.
Favoured companies could obtain credit, purchase com-
petitors, repay the loans in a depreciated currency, and
repeat the cycle with new loans. This process was well
under way before the Ruhr crisis of 1923, when the gov-
ernment started printing money to support striking
miners; ultimately this led to the hyperinflation in
1923.100
96. The register of the Weekblad van het Regt over the years 1914-1918
shows that contract revision on the basis of Article 1374(3) BW was
hardly ever claimed; when it was, it was denied, see e.g. Hof Amster-
dam, 7 April 1916, W. 10032. See also Rb. Almelo, 5 January 1916,
N.J. 16, 1162. Otherwise Rb. Rotterdam, 20 April 1916, N.J. 16, 1217.
See Meijers, Goede trouw (1937), at 281; Wery, Overmacht (1919), at
59-64.
97. See C.H. Feinstein, P. Temin & G. Toniolo, The European Economy
between the Wars (1997), at 1.
98. See Tipton, Europe (1987), at 169-72; Damsgaard Hansen, History
(2001), at 221-22.
99. See Tipton, Europe (1987), at 172-75.
100. See Tipton, Europe (1987), at 175-77; Damsgaard Hansen, History
(2001), at 223-24.
Between 1913 and 1919, the Netherlands had the high-
est growth rates of Western Europe. It profited from the
German boom and the export of food to Britain. In the
1930s, however, the Dutch economy was hit by the
depression. Sticking to the gold standard – probably
motivated by the interests of an influential financial sec-
tor – meant a further loss of competitiveness. In 1936,
the guilder was to be devalued by 20%.101
It was only because of the inflation after the war that
German courts started to explicitly interfere in contracts
where performance was not impossible but ‘merely’
impracticable. This changing attitude therefore strongly
reflects the economic conditions of the respective juris-
dictions: Germany knew hyperinflation in the 1920s and
is now an ‘open’ system; Britain, France, and the
Netherlands did not and are still ‘closed’ systems
– despite a statutory basis in Article 6:258 of the Dutch
Burgerlijk Wetboek to modify or set aside contracts in
case of frustration.
4.1 England
The case law in the first decade after the war was a con-
tinuation of the wartime decisions. Rather, the immedi-
ate post-war cases are really cases which arose during
the war, and it is likely that this influenced the resolu-
tion of these cases. Indeed, directly after the war in sev-
eral more cases discharge was given because the subject-
matter, a person or thing, had become – temporarily –
unavailable for performance: these contracts often con-
cerned charter parties that were frustrated where the
ship was requisitioned by the government.102 Also in
Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co. of 1919, it was
held by the majority that a coal charter from September
to the following September was a substantially different
thing from a coal charter from April to the following
April, and that by implication the contract was dis-
charged by frustration of the adventure.103 In cases
where long delays in performance resulted from war-
time restrictions, it was held that performance need not
be resumed in the totally altered conditions which pre-
vailed when those restrictions were removed after the
war.104
However, in the course of the Second World War, par-
ticularly the implied condition theory was criticised as
being dependent on the – subjective – intentions of the
parties, thus widening the potential application of the
doctrine of frustration.105 The Second World War gave
rise to few reported cases in which contracts were held
101. See Tipton, Europe (1987), at 181-82; Damsgaard Hansen, History
(2001), at 226, 244; De Jong, Dutch Economy (2005), at 144.
102. E.g.Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co. (1919) A.C. 435; Hirji Mulji v.
Cheong Yue SS. Co. (1926) A.C. 497. See Trotter, Contract (1940), at
132; Treitel, Contract (2003), at 872-74; Treitel, Frustration (1994), at
53.
103. Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co. (1919) A.C. 435. See McElroy,
Impossibility (1941), at 167-69.
104. E.g. Acetylene Co. of GB v. Canada Carbide Co. (1922) 8 Ll.L.Rep. 456.
See also Treitel, Contract (2003), at 873, 882; Treitel, Frustration
(1994), at 217.
105. See e.g. P.H.T. Rogers, The Effect of War on Contract (1940), at 50-51;
McElroy, Impossibility (1941), at 159; Gottschalk, Impossibility (1945),
at 30-31. See also Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 579-80.
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to be frustrated otherwise than by supervening illegality,
i.e. a government prohibition.106
In the British Movietonews107 case of 1952, the House of
Lords rejected the view that a mere uncontemplated
turn of events (in that case, the cessation of wartime
conditions in which the contract was made) was grounds
for frustration.108 Lord Simon said:
‘The parties to an executory contract are often faced,
in the course of carrying it out, with a turn of events
which they did not at all anticipate – a wholly abnor-
mal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of
currency, an unexpected obstacle to the execution, or
the like. Yet this does not in itself affect the bargain
which they have made.’109
Inflation therefore does not seem to be a ground for dis-
charge.110 In the Davis Contractors111 case of 1956, it was
confirmed that ‘impracticability’ was generally not suffi-
cient to frustrate a contract in English law: only a ‘fun-
damental’ change of circumstances would bring the doc-
trine of discharge into play. Moreover, in this case Lord
Radcliffe advanced that the doctrine of frustration is
explained as occurring by operation of law rather than
upon the construction of an implied term.112
Since the two aforementioned cases, there seems to be
some narrowing in the scope of the doctrine of frustra-
tion.113 The Suez crisis of 1956, the closing of the Suez
Canal again in 1967, the oil crisis in 1973, and the out-
break of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in 1980 all
resulted in relatively few cases in which contracts were
discharged on the doctrine of frustration.114
4.2 France
During the war, the Cour de Cassation never extended
impossibility of performance to include frustration of
purpose or economic impracticability – unlike the Eng-
lish or German judiciaries. Also after the war, when
inflation started to rise,115 the Cour de Cassation refused
to give judicial relief on grounds of monetary deprecia-
tion. Although the language and the spirit of the Code
civil were indeed generally unfavourable towards such
judicial relief,116 there were a number of clauses which
106. See Treitel, Contract (2003), at 868 and 887; Treitel, Frustration (1994),
at 50.
107. British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas (1952) A.C.
166.
108. See Treitel, Contract (2003), at 867; Mann, Legal Aspect (1982), at
111.
109. British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas (1952) A.C.
166, at 185.
110. Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 275-76. Otherwise Mann, Legal Aspect,
at 111.
111. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban DC (1956) A.C. 696.
112. See Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 9, 49, 578-84; Treitel, Contract
(2003), at 881; Mann, Legal Aspect (1982), at 111; Beale, Contract
(2010), at 1115-18.
113. Many factors account for this trend: see Treitel, Contract (2003), at
868; Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 49-51.
114. See Treitel, Contract (2003), at 868; Treitel, Frustration (1994), at 50.
115. See Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1054 (with reference to
E. Dulles, The French Franc 1914-1928 (1929), at 511).
116. E.g. Articles 1652 and 1895 Code civil.
could serve as a basis for relief, most prominently Arti-
cle 1134. However, standing by its decision in the Canal
de Craponne case that impossibility of performance must
be absolute,117 the Cour de Cassation ruled that the rise
in prices after the war did not excuse the parties from
performance: in the case Bacou v. Saint-Pé of 1921, the
tenant had – at the end of the lease – the option to either
return the leased livestock or its value, which had been
determined in advance, at the conclusion of the lease on
4 December 1910. Here, the owner argued in vain that
he was entitled to at least part of the increase in market
value of the livestock:118 in 1920, retail prices had
increased by more than 300% since the beginning of the
war in 1914.119
Basically the only doctrine of French private law
employed by the Cour de Cassation to relieve creditors of
the effects of inflation was the doctrine of lésion.
According to the doctrine of lésion, a seller of land who
receives less than five-twelfths of the land’s true value,
as determined by a commission of three experts, is enti-
tled to rescission unless the buyer offers to increase the
consideration to nine-tenths of the true value.120 After
the war, the franc underwent a period of constant weak-
ening, interrupted by periods of rapid depreciation, viz.
between 1918 and early 1921,121 and between the end of
1923 and July 1926, when Poincaré stabilised the cur-
rency.122 When the franc started to depreciate rapidly,
the Cour de Cassation, departing from its previous posi-
tion, held that with respect to fixed-price options for the
sale of land, the relevant date was not that of agreement
on but of exercise of the option.123
4.3 German Republic
Unsurprisingly, by the beginning of 1919 the Reichs-
gericht still held that
117. E.g. Cass. Civ., 6 March 1876, De Galliffet v. Commune de Pélissane,
D. 1876.1.193; Cass. Civ., 24 March 1874, Comuset, Heina et comp. v.
Way, S. 1874.1.428. See also Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
1050-51; Rösler, Hardship (2007), at 500-501.
118. Cass. Civ., 6 June 1921, Bacou v. Saint-Pé, D. 1921.1.73, S.
1921.1.193. See Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 307; Beale, Contract (2010),
at 1032-34; Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1052-53. See also e.g.
Cass. civ., 15 November 1934, Société Anon. v. Cie. des Mines de
Graissessac, Gaz. Pal. 1934.1.68. See Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
1056.
119. See Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1054 (with reference to
E. Dulles, The French Franc 1914-1928 (1929), at 511).
120. Articles 1674-84 Code civil. See Fabre-Magan, Contrat (2010), at
411-14; Mazeaud, Leçons (1998), at 209-24; J. Gordley and A.T. von
Mehren, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private Law
(2006), at 464; Cooper, Inflation (1936), at 68.
121. Wholesale prices increased from 360 in December 1918 to 444 in
December 1920, see Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1053-54 (refer-
ence to Dulles, Franc (1929), at 510).
122. Wholesale prices increased from 429 in November 1923 to 854 in July
1926, see Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at 1053-54 (reference to
Dulles, Franc (1929), at 510).
123. E.g. Cass. req., 1 August 1924, De Scorailles v. Le Fer de Bonbon, S.
1926.1.54 (concerning an option given in 1912 and exercised in April
1922); CA Paris, 12 November 1928, De Coubertin v. D’Avaray, D.
1929.42 (concerning an option given in 1905 and exercised in 1925).
See Ghestin, Effets (2001), at 334; Von Mehren, Civil Law (1977), at
1063-64; Renner, Inflation (1999), at 14-15.
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‘A mere rise in price cannot release the seller, even if
it results in considerable loss to him, from his con-
tractual obligation. There would be no standard for
determining what degree of loss was required before
this liberation would be permitted. This would lead
to an intolerable degree of legal uncertainty.’124
But prices during the years 1918–19 went up much
more rapidly than before, and in two decisions of
December 1919 and July 1920 the Reichsgericht was will-
ing to recognise that although a rise in prices is by itself
insufficient, if dislocation of industry and trade were to
make performance ‘essentially different’ than that con-
tracted for,125 or lead to the economic ruin of a party to
a contract,126 rescission should be granted.127 In Sep-
tember 1920, the Reichsgericht then extended the con-
cept of impossibility to include economic impossibility
and turned to good faith and the general theory of clau-
sula rebus sic stantibus as the legal resources available to
deal with contracts affected by inflation.128 For the first
time, the Reichsgericht ordered a revision of the price,
the loss to be fairly apportioned between the parties.129
However, the Reichsgericht restricted the possibility of
rescission or price revision to extreme circumstances,
depending on the factual circumstances of each case,
and emphasised whether enforcement of the contract
would lead to the economic ruin of the party seeking
relief.130 Moreover, contractors whose continuing per-
formance would end up in positive loss131 were treated
differently from those whose continuing performance
would lead to a lost gain:132 the courts were more willing
to grant relief to the former than to the latter.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1921, the mark started to
depreciate rapidly and the courts, recognising that
changes in prices were mainly attributable to changes in
the value of money, were willing to grant relief in
wholesale transactions.133 In a decision of November
1921, the Reichsgericht gave up the requirement of eco-
nomic ruin as basis for relief and developed new theo-
ries of fair equivalence of performance134 and ‘changed
conditions’135 under the provision of good faith. The
remedy granted to the creditor under such theories was
124. Reichsgericht, Second Civil Senate, 25 February 1919 (B. v. Berliner
Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft), 95 ERGZ 41.
125. Dawson, Effects of inflation (1934), at 184.
126. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 8 July 1920 (B. v. F.), 99 ERGZ 258.
127. Fundamental and in great detail on the German hyperinflation cases in
the 1920s, Thiessen, German Hyperinflation (forthcoming).
128. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 21 September 1920 (Sp. Co. v. F.
Co.), 100 ERGZ 129. See Dörner, Erster Weltkrieg (1986), at 400;
Wieacker, Das Sozialmodell (1974), 25.
129. Beale, Contract (2010), at 1138.
130. Reichsgericht, Fifth Civil Senate, 16 April 1921 (P. & Co. v. M.), 102
ERGZ 98.
131. Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 21 September 1920 (Sp. Co. v. F.
Co.), 100 ERGZ 129. See Dawson, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 184.
132. Reichsgericht, Fifth Civil Senate, 16 April 1921 (P. & Co. v. M.), 102
ERGZ 98. See Dawson, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 187-88.
133. Reichsgericht, Second Civil Senate, 29 November 1921 (Marseiwerke v.
H.), 103 ERGZ 177.
134. Reichsgericht, Second Civil Senate, 29 November 1921 (Marseiwerke v.
H.), 103 ERGZ 177.
135. Dawson, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 193.
rescission, unless the debtor was willing to pay a reason-
able increase in the contract price.136 The rapid depreci-
ation soon culminated in two decisions of February 1922
and June 1922, in which the Reichsgericht recognised
judicial revision and considered that revision should be
preferred over rescission.137 Moreover, these judge-
ments were the first to openly acknowledge Oertmann’s
theory of the Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage (disappear-
ance of the contractual basis) as a basis for that
revision.138 Finally, the latter judgement implicitly rec-
ognised for the first time that the face value of the mark
might not be its value for legal purposes.139 Still the
Reichsgericht emphasised the limited scope of these deci-
sions to the particular circumstances of the case. The
primary focus of judicial interference up to this point
had been bilateral contracts for sale or performance of
services.140 Outside the field of commercial contracts,
only certain contracts having social impact, such as ali-
mony payments or payment for the purpose of support
and maintenance, were granted relief.141
On 28 November 1923, however, when the dollar parity
of the mark was quoted at 4.2 trillion, the Reichsgericht
gave the most famous decision, which stated that under
the new circumstances of inflation, the legal tender leg-
islation contradicted the provision of good faith of the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch § 242 and the latter must be giv-
en precedence over the former.142 For the first time, the
Reichsgericht ordered revalorisation of simple money
debts,143 the rate to be fixed by the court failing the par-
ties’ agreement on a fair price. The Reichsgericht sugges-
ted that in determining the amount of revalorisation, a
case-by-case fair determination of the interests of both
parties was required.144 From this decision, a new era of
– enormously difficult – judicial revalorisation had star-
ted.145
The major reform of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in 2002
eventually supplied a statutory basis for the doctrine of
the disappearance of the contractual basis (Wegfall der
Geschäftsgrundlage) in § 313. The provision was
designed to codify the case law as it had developed since
the 1920s.146
136. Dawson, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 193-94.
137. Reichsgericht, 3 February 1922, 103 ERGZ 328; Reichsgericht, Third
Civil Senate, 27 June 1922 (K. v. W.), 104 ERGZ 394. See Beale, Con-
tract (2010), at 1139-41.
138. P. Oertmann, Die Geschäftsgrundlage. Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff (1921).
See Markesinis, Contract (2006), at 322; Beale, Contract (2010), at
1141. The resemblance with the English doctrine of frustration as
explained in Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. (1918) A.C.
119, is striking. See above 3.3.
139. Renner, Inflation (1999), at 10.
140. Renner, Inflation (1999), at 11.
141. Dawson, Effects of Inflation (1934), at 198-99.
142. Reichsgericht, Fifth Civil Senate, 28 November 1923 (St. v. R.), 107
ERGZ 78.
143. Renner, Inflation (1999), at 11.
144. Renner, Inflation (1999), at 12.
145. Renner, Inflation (1999), at 11.
146. See Markesinis, Contract (2006), at 324, 327-30; Beale, Contract
(2010), at 1141-1148.
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4.4 The Netherlands
After the war, force majeure was accepted in hardly any
cases as reason to discharge a contract. The judiciary
again stressed that the event making performance
impossible had to be unforeseen, and this turned out to
hardly ever be the case.147 During the war, the assimila-
tion of the practically impossible with the absolutely
impossible had become generally accepted.148 However,
just as the courts in England, France, and the German
Empire, Dutch courts after the war appeared to be
reluctant to rescind or interfere with contracts because
of an increase in prices.149 Although the Hoge Raad in
1923 had decided that whether or not a contract had
been performed in good faith, the subjective intention of
the parties was not decisive but the objective criteria of
reasonableness and equity,150 this remained an excep-
tion. In the following decade, the Hoge Raad consistent-
ly refused to grant relief on the basis of the principle of
good faith in e.g. Article 1374(3) of the Burgerlijk Wet-
boek.151
In 1977, the Hoge Raad – probably for the first time –
held that under unforeseen and very serious circumstan-
ces, according to criteria of reasonableness and equity, a
debtor – here a fraudulent physician – could not expect
the contract to be maintained in its unlimited form.152
The new Dutch Civil code of 1992, in line with this case
law and the ideas of Meijers, provided that the court
could modify the effects of a contract or set it aside in
whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen circumstan-
ces which are of such a nature that the co-contracting
party, according to criteria of reasonableness and equity,
may not expect the contract to be maintained in an
unmodified form (Article 6:258 of the Burgerlijk Wet-
boek (1992)).153 However, despite this statutory basis,
Dutch courts hardly ever modify a contract but seem to
adhere to a ‘closed’ system in judicial practice.154
147. Levenbach, Kontraktsband (1923), at 107, lists for the years 1919 to
1921 fourteen cases: in just one of these the contract was discharged
by force majeure because the event was considered to be unforeseen.
148. See above 3.4. and also Meijers, Verandering (1918), at 135.
149. E.g. Hof Amsterdam, 3 March 1919, W. 10488; Rb. Den Haag, 15 April
1919, W. 10472 confirmed Hof Den Haag, 4 October 1920, W. 10780.
See Levenbach, Kontraktsband (1923), at 203.
150. HR, 9 February 1923, W. 11039. See Meijers, Goedetrouw (1937), at
281; Wery, Overmacht (1919), at 59-64.
151. Meijers, Goede trouw (1937), at 281, lists fifteen cases for the period
1925 to 1936 in which the Hoge Raad held that a court may never on
the basis of good faith revise or discharge what has been agreed upon
between the parties.
152. HR, 16 December 1976, NJ 76, 136 (Ziekenfonds). Probably this word-
ing was influenced by the 1961 draft for a new Dutch Civil code: see on
this draft and also about Meijers’ influence on it, K. Bezemer, ‘Meijers
on imprévision in 1918, in 1937, in 1950, and today’, in A.G. Caster-
mans et al. (eds.), Foreseen and unforeseen circumstances (2012) 3, at
11-13. See also HR, 27 April 1984, NJ 84, 679 (Nationale Volksbank/
Sipke Helder). See Bezemer, Meijers (2012), at 13.
153. See Bezemer, Meijers (2012), at 11-3.
154. See Hondius, Unexpected circumstances (2011), at 643. See also HR,
20 February 1998, NJ 1998, 493 (Briljant Schreuders/ABP).
5 Conclusion
Before coming to any conclusions, a brief summary of
the above observations will be made.
Firstly, before the war the English, French, German,
and Dutch legal systems had rather uncompromising
attitudes towards unforeseen circumstances. Discharge
would be granted only in the case of absolute impossi-
bility, although exceptionally in the English, German,
and Dutch jurisdictions a kind of subjective impossibili-
ty was considered enough. This strict approach runs
parallel with the stable economic circumstances before
the war, the then prevailing liberal, individualist eco-
nomic theories, and legal doctrines concerning the sanc-
tity of contract and the right to specific performance,
expressed e.g. in the rule pacta sunt servanda.
Secondly, during the war, the courts – perhaps surpris-
ingly – more or less continued their pre-war approach of
only allowing contract rescission in cases of absolute
impossibility. The English and German courts some-
what relaxed this strict approach, for instance in the
sense that they held a contract discharged if perform-
ance after a period of temporal impossibility would
amount to something completely different than that of
the contract conclusion. The French judiciary was divi-
ded in a strict sense between the Cour de cassation,
which adhered to an absolute impossibility doctrine, and
the Conseil d’état, which followed the doctrine of impré-
vision. The Dutch courts seemed to even restrict the
scope of discharge because of supervening impossibility.
Although the war caused hardship in the various coun-
tries, their economies still functioned: in some cases
indeed supervening impossibility occurred, but in many
cases it was still very much business as usual. During
the war, English, French, German, and Dutch courts
thus managed to uphold the sanctity of contract and its
underlying adagium pacta sunt servanda – though falter-
ingly and with increasing difficulty towards the end of
the war.
Thirdly, only after war, due to their various experiences
the legal systems took a different course. In England,
France, and the Netherlands, the courts continued their
existing approach, or rather even restricted it again, as
was the case in England: the sanctity of contract was
saved.155 In Germany, however, as inflation progressed
and the rise in prices was more clearly the result of cur-
rency fluctuations rather than of the value of commodi-
ties, the courts relaxed their attitude towards the legal
consequences of contracts affected by inflation.156 The
experience gained from the events occurring in Germa-
ny led to a gradual development towards an ‘open’ sys-
tem, during the various stages of inflation.157 Clearly the
rate of inflation played the primary role in shaping the
courts’ attitudes. Direct price revision was ordered for
the first time in Germany only in 1920, when prices
155. See e.g. Mazeaud, Leçons (1998), at 730.
156. Renner, Inflation (1999), at 11.
157. The following discussion relies partly on Renner, Inflation (1999), at
16-17.
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were about eight to ten times higher than their pre-war
level. Even then, revision was limited through the
requirement of economic ruin and was made dependent
upon the factual circumstances of each case. Only by the
end of 1921, when prices were about 50 times higher
than their pre-war level, did courts turn to a more gen-
eral theory of intervention, though large-scale revision
began only at the end of 1923, when the collapse of the
currency was complete.
During the war, the English, French, and Dutch experi-
ence resembled the German experience, and all man-
aged to maintain the sanctity of contract. It was only
after the war that these experiences diverged: although
the British, French, German, and Dutch economies all
struggled and knew inflation, only Germany experi-
enced hyperinflation and the collapse of its currency.
The British, French, and Dutch inflation levels at their
peaks never exceeded a tenfold increase in the level of
prices.158
Since the hyperinflation in the aftermath of the war,
Germany had an ‘open’ system, which provides for
either revision or rescission in cases of frustration of
contract. England, France, and the Netherlands, did not
experience such hyperinflation and remained ‘closed’:
England has, although impossibility is not necessarily
absolute, only rescission in case of frustration; the
French Cour de cassation adheres to an absolute impossi-
bility doctrine – although the Conseil d’état applies the
doctrine of imprévision to government contracts; the
Dutch courts hardly ever modify a contract – despite a
statutory basis in Article 6:258 of the new Dutch Bur-
gerlijk Wetboek of 1992 to modify or set aside contracts
in case of frustration – and thus adhere to a ‘closed’ sys-
tem in judicial practice.159
The following hypothesis can be formulated on the basis
of the above observations: only countries which have
experienced economic disaster, such as hyperinflation,
might develop an ‘open’ system; otherwise countries
will tend to retain ‘closed’ systems, which has been the
norm since the late nineteenth century: pacta sunt ser-
vanda.
Indeed, several other countries with legal systems which
have been classified as ‘open’ in legal practice – such as
Austria, Slovenia, and Greece160 – experienced hyperin-
flation, either in the aftermath of the First World War
– Austria and Slovenia (as former part of the Habsburg
Empire) – or the Second World War – Greece.161 Other
countries with legal systems which have been classified
as ‘closed’ in legal practice – Belgium, Denmark, Ire-
land, and Scotland162 – did not experience such hyper-
158. See Renner, Inflation (1999), at 25 and Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at
389-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price Indices).
159. See Hondius, Unexpected circumstances (2011), at 643.
160. See Hondius, Unexpected circumstances (2011), at 643-44.
161. See Renner, Inflation (1999), at 25; Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 390
(Table H1, Wholesale Price Indices).
162. See Hondius, Unexpected circumstances (2011), at 643-44.
inflation in the aftermath of the First or Second World
War.163
Economic situations do not produce legal forms auto-
matically but only contain the chance that, when a legal-
technical discovery is made, it may also be
propagated.164 Here, however, the relation between the
experience of hyperinflation in the aftermath of the
First World War and the development of an ‘exception-
al’ remedy for unexpected circumstances is quite strong.
Nevertheless, a shared European experience in this field
seems a high price for a shared European remedy for
unexpected circumstances.
163. See Mitchell, Statistics (1978), at 390-91 (Table H1, Wholesale Price
Indices).
164. See M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die
gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß, 3: Recht (MWG I/
22-3) (2010), 346: ‘Ökonomische Situationen gebären neue Rechtsfor-
men nicht einfach automatisch aus sich, sondern enthalten nur eine
Chance dafür, daß eine rechtstechnische Erfindung, wenn sie gemacht
wird, auch Verbreitung finde.’
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